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Summary
Health coverage programs often fall short of their 
enrollment goals. Even the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP), now quite successful along with Medicaid 
in reaching uninsured children, suffered low enrollment 
rates during its early years. 
By contrast, programs like Low-Income Subsidies for 
Medicare Part D and Massachusetts’s 2006 health reforms 
rapidly achieved high participation levels by using reliable 
data to identify eligible consumers, qualify them for 
assistance and enroll them into coverage. For similar 
results when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act’s (ACA) main provisions begin in 2014, federal policy-
makers could pursue a strategy with five parts:
1. A proactive national campaign that uses data 
to identify the uninsured and enroll them into 
coverage. On their federal income tax returns, 
uninsured taxpayers could be allowed to request 
subsidized coverage and authorize the use of their tax 
information to establish eligibility. That could start the 
enrollment process for the 86 percent of uninsured 
consumers who file such returns, including 75 percent 
of the uninsured with incomes below poverty. 
2. Basing eligibility determinations on reliable data, 
whenever possible. Information already in government 
hands could establish eligibility without delaying 
enrollment until uninsured consumers have completed 
forms that, in effect, tell the government what it 
already knows. 
3. Partnering with states to help consumers receive 
hands-on assistance applying for Medicaid, CHIP 
and subsidies in the exchange. Such assistance will 
probably be essential to many consumers who find 
it difficult to navigate even a simplified process. 
Consumers may also need this help if data are not 
enough to establish their eligibility. 
4. Consumer-friendly enrollment systems. Consumers 
could provide identifying information on a secure Web 
site, see their household circumstances as shown by 
reliable data, make necessary corrections and receive 
an eligibility determination in real-time. They could 
either choose a health plan or ask the exchange to 
pick one, based on information volunteered by the 
consumer. A consumer who neither selects a plan nor 
asks the exchange to do so would be assigned by default 
to a low-cost plan. If premiums are charged, such 
default enrollment would become effective only if the 
consumer promptly made the first monthly payment. 
5. Effective interagency coordination. Interagency efforts 
to maximize enrollment of the eligible uninsured are 
likely to be more successful if one federal entity is 
designated to take the lead. 
By reducing the number of uninsured, these steps could 
help achieve the ACA’s basic goals for expanding coverage. 
They could also contribute to the effective implementation 
of insurance reforms, since enrolling the healthy as well 
as the sick will help prevent such reforms from increasing 
premiums charged in the exchange. And by qualifying 
consumers for assistance through matches with reliable 
data, rather than by requiring public employees to 
manually evaluate and verify traditional application forms, 
this approach is likely to lower administrative costs, deter 
fraudulent applications and reduce the number of erroneous 
eligibility determinations. 
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Introduction
According to the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO), the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) will cover 
more than 30 million uninsured.1  Most 
are low- and moderate-income people 
who will qualify for Medicaid, the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP) or subsidies for premiums and 
out-of-pocket costs in the exchange. 
Policy-makers cannot count on 
enrollment reaching projected levels. 
Recent history is filled with coverage 
expansions that failed to achieve 
anticipated results, at both federal 
and state levels. For example, roughly 
2 million laid-off workers and their 
families received subsidies for COBRA 
coverage under the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, but CBO 
had projected that 7 million would 
benefit.2 An earlier program providing 
Health Coverage Tax Credits (HCTC) 
to laid-off workers covered fewer 
than one in five eligible uninsured,3 
with enrollment reaching less than 30 
percent of the levels forecast by CBO.4 
And at the state level, Maine’s Dirigo 
Health did not come close to reaching 
proponents’ expectations, undermining 
the initiative’s credibility with the 
public.5 
If the eligible uninsured do not enroll, 
the consequences will go beyond 
a failure to improve their access to 
care and economic security. Many 
who remain uninsured will pay a 
penalty. Moreover, if healthy people 
disproportionately remain uninsured, 
the ACA’s insurance reforms could 
increase premiums charged in health 
insurance exchanges, potentially to 
unsustainable levels. 
Fortunately, the ACA gives policy-
makers the tools to avoid these 
problems. This report describes a five-
part strategy through which federal 
officials can maximize enrollment of 
the eligible uninsured into subsidized 
coverage. By using 21st-century 
information technology to base 
eligibility determinations on reliable 
data whenever possible, this strategy 
also promises to lower public-sector 
administrative costs, cut red tape for 
families, deter fraudulent applications 
and reduce the number of erroneous 
eligibility determinations. 
As others have correctly observed,6 
state efforts will play a central role in 
determining the effectiveness of ACA’s 
coverage expansion. Federal decisions 
will also be important, however. This 
analysis primarily addresses the federal 
government’s role, although it touches 
on potentially helpful state actions that 
federal policy could permit, encourage 
or require. 
Part 1: A proactive national 
campaign that uses data to 
identify the uninsured and 
enroll them into coverage
For most eligible uninsured to receive 
subsidized coverage in 2014, it will 
be necessary but not sufficient to 
streamline enrollment, educate the 
public and facilitate applications. In 
recent years, the coverage expansions 
that quickly achieved high levels of 
participation also used data proactively 
to qualify and enroll eligible people, 
without delaying coverage until the 
completion of formal application forms. 
For example:
•	 Low-income subsidies (LIS) under 
Medicare Part D reached nearly 
three in four eligible beneficiaries (74 
percent) less than six months after  
the new benefit was first available. 
Four in five enrollees (81 percent) 
qualified without any need to file 
applications. Their eligibility was 
established, and they were enrolled 
into subsidized coverage, based on 
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services’ (CMS) proactive initiation 
of data matches with state Medicaid 
programs and the Social Security 
Administration (SSA).7 Participation 
rates later reached 81 percent, 
with data matches (rather than 
applications) yielding 85 percent  
of all LIS enrollment.8 
•	Massachusetts 2006 health reform 
legislation reduced the percentage 
of uninsured residents to the lowest 
level ever observed in any state.9 
Roughly one in four newly insured 
residents received subsidized coverage 
based on data matches with the 
state’s preexisting “free care pool,” 
without any need to file application 
forms. After nine months of program 
operation, more than 80 percent of 
enrollees into the state’s new subsidy 
program qualified based on these data 
matches.10 
By contrast, many federal and state 
programs without such proactive, 
data-driven enrollment strategies 
have fallen significantly short of 
their goals, including the programs 
mentioned earlier. Even CHIP, which 
together with Medicaid, now covers 
82 percent of eligible children,11 took 
a long time to achieve these results. 
Despite considerable outreach and 
streamlining of applications during 
the program’s start-up phase, only 60 
percent of eligible children participated 
in CHIP fully five years after states 
could first offer coverage in 1997.12 As 
the Congressional Research Service 
observed as late as 2001, “Until recently, 
there was general disappointment with 
the implementation progress under 
SCHIP, due to low enrollment rates early 
in the program.”13 
Put simply, the federal government 
cannot sit back and trust that, armed 
with good information, faced with a 
requirement to obtain coverage, and 
given options for easy enrollment, tens 
of millions of uninsured will rapidly 
come forward on their own and obtain 
health insurance. A proactive, data-
driven enrollment initiative will be 
needed for the ACA to avoid slowly 
rising enrollment levels during the 
initial years of full implementation. 
One possible candidate for such a 
proactive initiative involves the filing 
of income tax returns. A significant 
percentage of the uninsured who 
qualify for assistance could be 
identified and enrolled into coverage 
as part of the tax filing process. In 
fact, the ACA specifically authorizes 
HHS to permit consumers to apply 
for subsidies by “request[ing] the 
Secretary of the Treasury to provide 
[tax return] information… directly 
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to the Exchange.”14 More broadly, 
the legislation permits consumers to 
initiate an eligibility determination by 
authorizing the disclosure of relevant 
data, rather than by completing formal 
application forms.15 
An estimated 86 percent of uninsured 
Americans file federal income tax 
returns. Even among the uninsured with 
incomes below the federal poverty level 
(FPL), fully 75 percent file tax returns 
(Figure 1). 
When taxpayers file their returns 
in 2014 and later years, they will be 
providing most of the information 
needed to determine their eligibility 
for Medicaid, CHIP and subsidies in 
the exchange, as the following section 
of this report makes clear. Why not let 
taxpayers use their returns to apply for 
subsidized coverage? Requiring them 
to also complete a largely redundant 
subsidy application form would add 
little value, compared with the resulting 
government administrative costs, 
burdens on families and consequent 
reduction in enrollment among the 
eligible uninsured. 
Policy-makers could establish 
mechanisms through which, at the 
taxpayer’s option, filing a tax return 
starts the eligibility determination and 
enrollment process.17 For example, 
taxpayers could be required to identify 
any uninsured household members on a 
supplemental form filed along with the 
1040.18 To help such family members 
obtain coverage, the form would:
•	Give a taxpayer the option, by 
checking a box to—
 » Authorize IRS conveyance of 
relevant tax return data to the 
taxpayer’s exchange for the 
purpose of determining eligibility 
for subsidized health coverage;
 » Authorize the exchange to use 
other available information to 
determine eligibility, if necessary; 
and 
 » Enroll uninsured household 
members into coverage, if they 
qualify for Medicaid, CHIP 
or subsidized coverage in the 
exchange; 
•	Ask for the best way to contact the 
taxpayer if necessary to complete 
the eligibility determination and 
enrollment process; and
•	Provide information about health 
insurance exchanges and available 
health coverage subsidies.
To be most effective, such a tax-based 
initiative would benefit from IRS 
outreach to tax preparation software 
vendors and to both paid and volunteer 
tax preparers.19 
Most low-income tax returns are filed 
early in the year, so income information 
on those returns is relatively current. 
For example, by March 2, 2007, 69 
percent of tax returns claiming the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for 
2006 had been filed, compared to 
39 percent among returns in general 
(Figure 2). 
This approach has precedents. For 
example, families can have their federal 
income tax data automatically “pre-
populate” application forms for federally 
funded college student aid.20 Along 
similar lines, one of the most successful 
HCTC initiatives was a small “consent” 
pilot project. When taxpayers called the 
HCTC program office, they were asked 
if they wanted their contact information 
shared with their state to see if they 
could receive additional assistance. In 
the one state where the pilot was fully 
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Figure 1.  The estimated percentage of uninsured who filed federal  
income tax returns, by income: 2004
Source: 2005 CPS, using the methodology described in Dorn, Garrett, et al.16 
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Figure 2.  The percentage of all individual income tax returns that were filed 
by various dates, all returns vs. returns claiming EITC: Tax Year 2006
Source:  IRS, Statistics of Income Division, Tax Year 2006 Taxpayer Usage Study (author’s calculations). 
Note:  The listed percentages do not take into account any returns for tax year 2 06 that were filed after October 26, 2007. IRS-published data 
include only the dates for which data points are shown in this Figure. 
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implemented, 83 percent of taxpayers 
consented. When state officials 
contacted them, more than 90 percent 
were enrolled into coverage.21 
Of course, people make mistakes 
on their tax returns, despite the 
information they receive on W-2s, 1099 
forms and the like. IRS corrects up to 
7 million returns a year (less than 5 
percent of all returns) for math errors, 
failure to include information available 
from third-party sources or special 
audits of returns claiming EITC.22 When 
such corrections are made for people 
receiving health insurance tax credits, 
the amount of such credits will likewise 
need to be revisited.23 
This approach could potentially yield 
administrative cost savings for IRS. As 
with any effort to increase coverage, if 
fewer people are uninsured, fewer will 
go through IRS enforcement efforts. 
However, unique to this strategy is that 
the above-described notice, provided 
through supplemental tax forms, 
might be structured to fulfill, for many 
taxpayers, IRS’ duty under the ACA to 
“send a notification [of services available 
in the Exchange] to each individual who 
files an individual income tax return 
and who is not enrolled in minimum 
essential coverage.”24 
Not only would this approach increase 
IRS’ ability to identify uninsured 
taxpayers and greatly reduce the 
cost of mailing out notices, letting 
taxpayers begin the application process 
by checking a box would make the 
required IRS notice substantially 
more effective in helping uninsured 
taxpayers receive coverage. Long 
experience teaches that simply sending 
notices that encourage consumers to 
apply for assistance typically yields 
disappointing results, even when such 
notices tell consumers about valuable 
public benefits that cost them nothing 
to obtain. For example, in 2002 the 
Social Security Administration sent 16.4 
million letters to low-income Medicare 
beneficiaries who appeared to qualify 
for Medicare Savings Programs (MSP) 
based on federal income data. The 
letters provided information about 
MSP, which pays some or all Medicare 
cost-sharing, depending on income. The 
letters also included a phone number 
that could be called to enroll. Roughly 
74,000 people—0.5 percent of letter 
recipients—enrolled in MSP as a result.25 
Of course, the ACA’s individual mandate 
will increase consumer responsiveness 
to similar communications in the future. 
On the other hand, the requirement 
of making premium payments to 
enroll in coverage could reduce such 
responsiveness. Even if these two 
countervailing factors play out in a way 
that makes such “direct mail” campaigns 
substantially more effective than in the 
past, only modest results are likely. 
IRS officials may be concerned that 
using the tax filing process to facilitate 
enrollment into health coverage could 
set a precedent for other benefit 
programs. But this particular benefit 
program is unique in the degree 
to which IRS is deeply involved in 
program administration. Not only 
is IRS responsible for enforcing the 
requirement that nearly all Americans 
must have coverage, the subsidies 
themselves include tax credits as a major 
component. IRS thus bears considerable 
responsibility for the success of the 
ACA’s health coverage expansion. It does 
not seem unreasonable for IRS to make a 
major commitment to the effectiveness 
of that expansion. 
Policy-makers interested in a large 
and rapid increase in health coverage 
starting in 2014 will likely need to 
go beyond traditional methods and 
implement highly proactive, data-
driven mechanisms to substantially 
expedite enrollment. Regardless of 
which such mechanism is used, it 
will be important to carefully design 
the consumer experience. Consumer 
responses can be greatly affected by 
even small changes in how choices are 
framed and described, the complexity 
of language used, the volume of 
information provided, the medium 
used for communication, the steps 
that consumers are asked to take and 
similar factors. Intensively field-testing 
these mechanisms with consumers 
may thus be needed before their 
widespread deployment.
The approach described here may not 
fully replicate the completely automatic 
enrollment procedures that proved 
so effective with Medicare Part D and 
in Massachusetts by placing eligible 
consumers into subsidized coverage 
without any need for them to take 
action. If such procedures, which have 
been used to great effect in other benefit 
programs as well,26 could be applied to 
the ACA, early enrollment of eligible, 
uninsured consumers would increase, 
perhaps by significant amounts.27 
A gradual rather than a rapid rise in 
enrollment would give health care 
workforce strategies more time to build 
capacity before providers must absorb 
the full increase in demand for care 
that will result from ACA’s coverage 
expansion. But even taking into account 
existing constraints on health care 
supply, many policy-makers may seek 
to rapidly maximize enrollment of the 
eligible uninsured, both to improve 
access to care and to reduce adverse 
selection into subsidized coverage. 
These policy-makers will probably 
need to take proactive steps like those 
discussed here, which ask the uninsured 
to self-identify and which permit them 
to apply for coverage by simply checking 
a box on their tax returns. 
Part 2: Basing eligibility 
determinations on data, 
whenever possible
Critically important to simplifying 
application procedures is using data 
from reliable, third-party sources to 
establish eligibility, rather than denying 
coverage until consumers who can 
already be identified as eligible have 
described and documented their 
circumstances. In addition to expediting 
enrollment, such data-driven eligibility 
can also reduce administrative costs and 
erroneous eligibility determinations.28 
As the Government Accountability 
Office observed: 
“Improved information systems, sharing 
of data between programs, and use of 
new technologies can help programs 
to better verify eligibility and make the 
application process more efficient and 
less error prone. These strategies can 
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improve integrity not only by preventing 
outright abuse of programs, but also 
by reducing chances for client or 
caseworker error or misunderstanding. 
They can also help programs reach out 
to populations who may face barriers.”29 
ACA §1413(c)(3)(A)(ii) thus requires 
that, “to the maximum extent 
practicable,” all subsidy programs, 
including Medicaid, must “determine… 
eligibility on the basis of reliable, third 
party data, including information” from 
tax records, quarterly earnings and 
new hires’ reports, other public benefit 
programs and so forth.30 
For people to qualify for assistance on 
the basis of reliable data, the definition 
of eligibility must match available data. 
Otherwise, consumers need to provide 
documentation that supplements the 
data, which complicates the application 
process and may prevent some eligible 
individuals from enrolling. Recent 
federal reforms that achieved high 
participation rates thus involved 
eligibility definitions that precisely 
matched available data, such as Low-
Income Subsidies for Medicare Part D, 
described earlier, for which receipt 
of Medicaid or Supplemental Security 
Income in the prior calendar year 
automatically qualifies beneficiaries 
for assistance in the current year; and 
Medicare Part B premium subsidies, 
which are means-tested based on 
beneficiaries’ federal income tax returns 
two years in the past.31 
Consistent with this approach, the ACA 
structures tax credits and out-of-pocket 
cost-sharing subsidies in the exchange 
so eligibility is based on available data. 
Income-eligibility is defined in terms 
of modified adjusted gross income 
(MAGI). Prior-year income tax records 
establish eligibility for advance payment 
of tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies 
in the exchange unless consumers 
come forward to demonstrate changed 
circumstances.32 
With Medicaid, data-based eligibility 
rules and procedures are no less 
important. If local social service offices 
must use traditional, labor-intensive 
methods to process the enormous 
volume of Medicaid applications that 
they may face under the ACA, state 
administrative costs could become 
unsustainable, and Medicaid enrollment 
is likely to lag. Finding that many of 
the states with a particularly large 
percentage of uninsured who will 
qualify for Medicaid under the ACA 
have historically enrolled a relatively 
small proportion of their Medicaid-
eligible residents, Sommers and Epstein 
concluded that, without “a fundamental 
shift” in how Medicaid processes 
applications and determines eligibility, 
Medicaid will fall far short of the 
participation levels projected by CBO.33 
Serious inequity could result if only 
Medicaid—and not subsidized coverage 
in the exchange—is denied until 
applicants estimate and document 
current income levels using traditional 
methods, which include providing 
pay stubs and employer affidavits. In 
effect, such a bifurcated system would 
create an information superhighway 
for somewhat higher income people 
seeking tax credits, while the lowest-
income uninsured remain relegated to 
ox carts and muddy cow paths when 
they apply for help. 
ACA appears, at first glance, to limit  
the use of data in qualifying the 
uninsured for Medicaid. ACA provides 
that, while MAGI will govern Medicaid’s 
future eligibility determinations, 
MAGI “shall not be construed as 
affecting or limiting the application 
of the requirement… to determine an 
individual’s income as of the point in 
time at which an application for medical 
assistance… is processed.”34 
Read carefully, this section does not 
impose any new requirements to base 
Medicaid eligibility on point-in-time 
information. Rather, it states that 
MAGI does not override whatever 
requirements about timeliness of 
income information existed under 
earlier Medicaid law. These preexisting 
requirements are consistent with using 
information about the recent past to 
determine current income. For example, 
with SSI-linked Medicaid, current self-
employment income is calculated based 
on the previous year’s tax records, 
which, depending on household 
circumstances, may or may not need 
to be supplemented with information 
about more recent profit and loss.35 
HHS is responsible for interpreting this 
“point-in-time” section consistently with 
the numerous other ACA provisions 
that require data-based, streamlined 
eligibility determinations for all subsidy 
programs,36 including Medicaid. To 
discharge this responsibility, HHS could 
make clear that the “point-in-time” 
language in ACA permits the use of 
data to establish Medicaid eligibility 
when such data are sufficiently 
recent to show consumers’ current 
eligibility. If available data show a 
reasonable certainty of qualifying for 
assistance,37 Medicaid eligibility would 
automatically be established unless 
there is good reason to believe that 
the data are mistaken, incomplete 
or outdated. For example, consistent 
with the longstanding practice of 
some Medicaid programs, one year’s 
tax returns could establish income-
eligibility during the first three 
calendar months of the following year.38 
After those first few months, current 
income levels could often (but not 
always)39 be determined with more 
recent records, including both public 
and private sources of information 
about earnings and new hires. And 
if recent information shows income 
substantially below the maximum 
threshold of Medicaid income eligibility, 
eligibility might be established without 
demanding the prior presentation of pay 
stubs and employer affidavits. 
When available data show eligibility 
for subsidies in the exchange, rather 
than more generous Medicaid 
benefits, applicants could receive a 
notice indicating that, if household 
circumstances have worsened since the 
period covered by the data, providing 
more recent information may result 
in additional assistance. “Point-in-
time” income documentation would 
thus be a method for establishing 
Medicaid eligibility when other 
approaches fail, rather than a 
procedural requirement applicable even 
when such documentation would add 
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little or no value to the accuracy  
of eligibility determination. 
For Medicaid, CHIP and subsidies in the 
exchange, data will frequently show 
whether applicants meet eligibility 
requirements other than income. 
Citizenship can often be documented 
by a data match with records from 
the Social Security Administration 
(SSA), which will not issue a Social 
Security card to adults unless they 
prove citizenship or authorization to 
work in the United States.40 Satisfactory 
immigration status can frequently 
be demonstrated by Department of 
Homeland Security records (and perhaps 
SSA records as well, for immigrants 
who received a Social Security number 
based on an SSA determination of legal 
permanent residence).41 Even a lack of 
access to affordable ESI might be shown 
for many uninsured consumers through 
the data that employers and insurers 
will be required to report to IRS under 
the ACA.42 
Of course, for numerous consumers, 
data will not suffice to establish 
eligibility. In such cases, applicants 
may need to furnish documentation 
that requires manual processing. This 
is one of many reasons why individual 
consumer assistance will likely be an 
integral part of any effective program 
to maximize enrollment of eligible 
individuals into subsidized coverage,  
as discussed in the next section. It is 
also a reason why, under the approach 
described in the previous section of 
this paper, consumers beginning the 
enrollment process by checking a box 
on their tax returns would be asked 
for contact information. This would 
let application assisters follow-up by 
obtaining needed documentation or 
answers to unresolved questions. But 
if federal officials wish to maximize 
participation among eligible individuals 
during the early years of full ACA 
implementation, they may need to be 
mindful of ACA’s command that “to the 
maximum extent practicable” Medicaid, 
CHIP and the exchange must “establish, 
verify and update eligibility using … 
data matching.”43 
Part 3: Partnering with 
states to help consumers 
receive hands-on 
assistance 
Many types of consumer assistance 
will be important to the effective 
operation of the ACA. As noted 
earlier, Massachusetts’ 2006 reforms 
successfully enrolled most eligible 
individuals. One key strategy involved 
funding community-based organizations 
and giving providers financial incentives 
to work with consumers and fill out 
applications. Among all successful 
subsidy applications, 60 percent were 
thus completed, not by consumers 
themselves, but by community 
organizations and health care providers 
submitting applications on the 
consumers’ behalf via the state’s on-line 
“virtual gateway.”44 
Other states have likewise found 
that consumer assistance increases 
enrollment in health programs.45 This 
is consistent with research showing, 
with both health coverage and other 
benefits, that providing enrollment 
assistance can have a dramatic 
impact on participation that cannot 
be duplicated by simply providing 
consumers with information and asking 
them to take action on their own.46
Even with data playing a central 
role verifying and establishing 
eligibility, individual consumer 
assistance will be needed to 
maximize coverage for the 
uninsured who qualify for help, 
including the many for whom data 
will not fully establish eligibility. 
Enrollment assistance is one of the 
functions served by exchange Navigator 
programs.47 However, ACA does not fund 
Navigators until 2015, when they will 
be supported through the same funding 
stream that the state uses to pay other 
administrative costs of the exchange. 
Before then, federal grants finance 
exchanges, but ACA forbids such grants 
from paying for Navigator services.48 
To fill some of this gap, federal grants 
fund exchange call centers, which 
can be tasked to complete application 
forms and help with plan selection, thus 
fulfilling many important Navigator 
functions. For example, call centers 
could reach out to uninsured consumers 
who provide contact information on the 
IRS forms described in the first section 
of this report; the centers could then 
(a) obtain any additional information 
needed to qualify these consumers for 
assistance, and (b) help them choose a 
health plan. 
Of course, consumers may not know 
whether they qualify for Medicaid or 
subsidies in the exchange. Indeed, much 
of ACA’s architecture, with a single 
application form serving all programs 
and seamless “behind the scenes” 
processing of applications, seeks to 
eliminate any need for consumers 
to sort themselves among programs. 
Consistent with that basic approach, 
federal policy-makers could encourage 
each state to combine Exchange, CHIP 
and Medicaid administrative dollars 
to fund a single, integrated system of 
consumer assistance (potentially with 
private support helping states pay 
their share of Medicaid administrative 
costs).49 Establishing an adequately 
resourced, well-trained network of 
trusted community organizations and 
exchange call centers to help consumers 
navigate through what many will find 
to be a confusing new world will likely 
be an important part of maximizing 
eligible individuals’ coverage. 
Part 4: Consumer-friendly 
enrollment systems 
Considerable research establishes that, 
for public and private benefit programs, 
more people join when less work is 
required to enroll.50 Recognizing this 
common-sense insight, the ACA asks 
HHS to develop a single application 
form for all subsidy programs that is 
as simple as possible and that requests 
the minimum information needed to 
determine eligibility.51 
Such a simple, streamlined form is just 
the starting point in removing needless 
paperwork from the application 
process. In each state, the following 
procedure could establish eligibility 
for Medicaid, CHIP and subsidies in the 
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exchange based on available data while 
making adjustments to reflect changes 
in household circumstances since the 
period covered by such data:
1. A consumer can begin the 
application process by (1) providing 
identifying information, such as 
name, Social Security number, 
address and date-of-birth; and (2) 
asking for government records to be 
used to see whether the consumer 
qualifies for help.
2. Whether through such consent 
to disclosure or by describing 
household circumstances on a 
traditional form, when a consumer 
applies for subsidies, all relevant 
data, including federal income tax 
information and more recent records 
of quarterly earnings and new 
hires, are gathered, compiled into a 
user-friendly report and presented 
to the consumer for confirmation.52 
The consumer is informed that 
eligibility will be established based 
on the presented information unless 
the consumer makes a correction. 
If the consumer fails to act—for 
example, if the consumer did not 
apply on-line but instead requested 
coverage on his or her tax form, so 
the report needed to be mailed—
eligibility is established based on the 
data match. The “default” in case of 
inaction is thus coverage, rather than 
continuing uninsurance.53 
3. If the most recent available data, as 
potentially modified by the applicant, 
establish eligibility for assistance, the 
individual receives aid accordingly, 
whether through Medicaid, CHIP or 
subsidies in the exchange. 
4. When a consumer qualifies for 
tax credits in the exchange, he 
or she is informed that, if income 
has fallen since the period 
covered by available data, the 
consumer may be able to obtain 
additional help (including through 
Medicaid) by filing a supplemental 
application demonstrating changed 
circumstances. A similar policy 
already applies to Medicaid and CHIP 
under Express Lane Eligibility when 
states use prior-year income tax data 
to qualify children for assistance.54 
5. If available data are not sufficient to 
determine eligibility, the applicant 
is asked to answer the questions left 
open by the available data.
6. If available data show apparent 
ineligibility, the applicant receives 
notice and an opportunity to appeal, 
as provided in ACA §1411(f). 
Already, Wisconsin is establishing an on-
line system through which a consumer 
can provide identifying information, see 
a “read-out” of household circumstances 
shown by available data, and obtain an 
eligibility determination by confirming 
the data’s continuing accuracy or 
making necessary modifications.55 
HHS has made clear that such real-
time eligibility determinations must be 
standard operating procedure in states 
that use newly available enhanced 
federal funds to upgrade information 
technology systems needed for the data-
driven eligibility contemplated by ACA.56 
Of course, it will be necessary but not 
sufficient to streamline the process 
of qualifying for subsidies, since 
individuals found eligible for tax credits 
will remain uninsured until they enroll 
in a health plan offered through the 
exchange. With Medicaid and CHIP 
as well, most beneficiaries receive 
coverage through private health plans 
contracting with the state.
If a consumer qualifies for subsidies but 
fails to choose a plan, gaps in coverage 
can result, as illustrated by a recent 
study comparing Medicaid enrollment 
in California counties with and without 
health plan choices. In counties with 
just a single Medicaid plan, more than 
95 percent of applicants received 
coverage during their first month 
of eligibility. In the counties where 
consumers needed to choose a health 
plan, fewer than 1 percent enrolled 
in their first month, only half were 
enrolled after 3 months, and 1 in 6 (15-
17 percent) were still not enrolled fully 
7 months after establishing eligibility. 
In counties with health plan choices, 
beneficiaries were significantly more 
likely to be hospitalized for conditions 
that can often be prevented by 
outpatient care.57 
To avoid these problems, Medicaid 
and CHIP programs typically counsel 
consumers (either directly or through 
contractors) to help them select 
health plans. A similar function will 
be performed by the exchange, using 
Navigators or call center staff. But 
many Medicaid programs also apply 
routines through which, after their 
eligibility is established, consumers 
have a defined period of time in which 
to choose a plan. If they fail to do so, 
a plan is chosen for them. If a similar 
“default plan” mechanism applied to 
subsidized coverage in the exchange, 
fewer consumers might fall between 
the cracks and remain uninsured after 
eligibility determination.58 
However, unlike most Medicaid and 
CHIP coverage, subsidized plans in 
the exchange will charge premiums, 
which some default enrollees may not 
pay. Such non-payment could generate 
needless administrative costs for 
insurers and damage consumers’ credit 
ratings. To prevent these results, policy-
makers could specify that, with default 
enrollment in the exchange (a) coverage 
does not begin until the first month’s 
premium has been paid; and (b) to 
avoid adverse selection, such premium 
payment must be received within a 
specified interval or the consumer loses 
the right to join the plan until the next 
open enrollment period. 
While many policy-makers might 
view default enrollment as better than 
going without coverage, consumers 
are presumably more likely to receive 
the kind of coverage that meets their 
needs if they select a plan. On the 
other hand, long experience teaches 
that many consumers can be confused 
and overwhelmed by the need to 
make health plan choices, even 
when individual consumer assistance 
is offered.59 Inability to synthesize 
available information and identify one 
alternative as clearly preferred can cause 
procrastination or a failure to make a 
decision, as explained by Hanoch and 
Rice’s analysis of the literature: “one 
of the primary sources of decision 
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conflict arises when people are faced 
with competing alternatives and feel 
incapable of trading one option for 
another and in which no option stands 
out…. [R]ather than risking the potential 
regret associated with choosing the less 
than optimal choice, decision makers 
instead respond to their preference 
uncertainty by either delaying or opting 
out of choosing entirely.”60 
One approach worth considering would 
give consumers the option to ask the 
exchange to select an appropriate 
plan based on key facts volunteered 
by the consumer, such as the family’s 
address, doctor, any prescription drugs 
that are regularly used, etc.61 This 
would be analogous to the increasingly 
widespread practice, with retirement 
savings, of giving workers the option, 
rather than to allocate contributions 
across specified investment vehicles, 
to simply state the anticipated date of 
retirement and have the retirement fund 
automatically balance and re-balance 
investments over time to achieve good 
results by the worker’s specified “target 
date.”62 The exchange, along with 
Medicaid and CHIP, could likewise 
permit consumers to ask the state to 
pick a plan, based on key information 
provided by the consumer. Some people 
who would otherwise delay or avoid 
choosing a health plan might welcome 
this option as meeting their needs more 
effectively than default enrollment into 
a randomly chosen plan.63 
Part 5: Effective 
interagency coordination
At the federal level, much of the 
work described above requires the 
cooperation of multiple agencies, 
including the following:
•	Within HHS—
 » CMS’s Center for Medicaid, CHIP 
and Survey & Certification;
 » CMS’s Center for Consumer 
Information and Insurance 
Oversight, which is responsible  
for exchanges;
 » The Office of General Counsel;
 » The Office of Child Support 
Enforcement, which administers 
the National Directory of New 
Hires, which is an important 
source of information about recent 
employment earnings;64 
 » The National Coordinator for Health 
IT, which has been developing 
policy and procedures for data-
driven eligibility determinations; 
 » The Office of the Secretary; 
•	The Social Security Administration, 
which will need to provide 
eligibility-related information about 
citizenship, income and potentially 
immigration status;
•	The IRS, which will administer 
tax credits, enforce the individual 
coverage requirement, provide 
eligibility-related data about income 
and employer-sponsored insurance 
to exchanges and to state health 
coverage programs, and conduct 
outreach to uninsured taxpayers; 
•	The Treasury Department, which 
plays a key role establishing tax policy; 
•	Agencies that administer other 
need-based programs, such as the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP, formerly known 
as “Food Stamps”), which could 
potentially provide data that establish 
and verify eligibility for subsidized 
health coverage;65 and
•	The Office of Management and 
Budget, which must approve all 
regulations before promulgation. 
The effective collaboration of these 
diverse offices could be facilitated by 
a national coordinator for enrollment 
and retention. Enrollment-related tasks 
could easily lose out to the many other 
priorities competing for attention, and 
productive synergies between diverse 
parts of the government could fall by the 
wayside, unless a specific entity within 
the federal government coordinates 
the interagency effort to maximize 
participation by the eligible uninsured.
One possible approach is suggested by 
the example of intellectual property 
enforcement, which is addressed 
by eight different federal agencies. 
Legislative efforts to help these agencies 
work together included establishment of 
a coordinating council in 1999; creating 
an office of coordinator, located in the 
Department of Commerce, in 2006; 
and moving the coordinator into the 
White House beginning in December 
2009, supported by a new interagency 
advisory committee charged with 
working with the coordinator to craft 
a government-wide strategic plan for 
intellectual property enforcement.66 
Whether the identical or a modified 
approach to interagency coordination 
applies to enrolling the eligible 
uninsured under the ACA, these efforts 
are more likely to succeed if one national 
entity has lead responsibility to help 
relevant federal agencies work together 
in taking effective action to help eligible 
consumers receive coverage. 
Conclusion
One of the core goals of the ACA is 
providing health coverage to more 
than 30 million uninsured Americans. 
Unless federal policy-makers engage 
in a proactive, multifaceted effort to 
maximize participation by consumers 
who qualify for help, the legislation 
could easily fall short of its goals. But 
if the country’s leaders effectively use 
the ACA’s 21st-century tools to qualify 
eligible people for help, along with time-
tested methods for helping consumers 
navigate what can seem like a confusing 
and complicated system of enrollment 
and retention, policy-makers may be 
able to reach the legislation’s ambitious 
coverage objectives while lowering 
administrative costs and reducing 
eligibility errors.
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personal communication 2010, providing state 
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same time, federal audits found Louisiana to 
have an eligibility error rate of 1.54 percent—
far below the national average of 6.74 percent. 
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year, income tax records showing prior-year 
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updated based quarterly earnings data. On 
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and wage levels, which are often reflected 
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“Income Volatility Complicates Food 
Assistance,” Amber Waves, USDA Economic 
Research Service, September 2006, Volume 4, 
No. 4, pp. 16-21. In a second example, there 
will be cases in which eligibility cannot be 
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allowed to document children’s citizenship 
based on data matches with SSA, 24 states 
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Medicaid and CHIP is Up and Running: Data 
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Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, April 
20, 2010. 
41 SSA data matches might be used to confirm 
lawful presence in the U.S. for immigrants 
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one government agency with documents 
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those same documents. 
 
For many immigrants who qualify for 
Medicaid, CHIP, or subsidies in the exchange, 
SSA data will not be sufficient to establish 
their eligibility. Such data do not show the 
date on which an immigration status was 
granted, which is usually needed to determine 
Medicaid eligibility for adults (and in some 
states, children). Further, some legally present 
immigrants have not tried to obtain Social 
Security cards and so would not be included 
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differences in the spelling of a name or other 
factors can prevent a match with SSA records, 
even for immigrants who have received Social 
Security cards. Accordingly, more traditional 
verification procedures with the Department 
of Homeland Security will need to apply when 
SSA data matches do not confirm satisfactory 
immigration status. 
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states have good access to information about 
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requirements. 
43 ACA §1413(c)(3)(A)(i). 
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Enrollment for Kids National Briefing, 
December 10, 2010.
45 See, e.g., Ian Hill, Corinna Hawkes, et al., 
Congressionally Mandated Evaluation 
of the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program: Final Cross-Cutting Report on the 
Findings from Ten State Site Visits, prepared 
by the Urban Institute and Mathematica Policy 
Research, Inc., for the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Revised June 2004, 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001343_
schip.pdf; Mireille Jacobson and Thomas 
C. Buchmueller, “Can Private Companies 
Contribute To Public Programs’ Outreach 
Efforts? Evidence From California,” Health 
Affairs, March/April 2007; 26(2): 538-548; 
Gerry Fairbrother, Jennifer Stuber, Melinda 
Dutton, Roberta Scheinmann, and Rachel 
Cooper, “An Examination of Enrollment of 
Children in Public Health Insurance in New 
York City Through Facilitated Enrollment,” 
Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New 
York Academy of Medicine, 81(2): 191-205, 
2004; A. Aizer, “Public Health Insurance, 
Program Take-Up, And Child Health,” The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, August 
2007, Vol. 89, No. 3, pp 400–415. 
46 Laura Summer and Jennifer Thompson, Best 
Practices to Improve Take-Up Rates in Health 
Insurance Programs Final Report, prepared by 
the Georgetown Health Policy Institute for the 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
August 18, 2008 ; Victoria Wachino and 
Alice Weiss, Maximizing Kids’ Enrollment 
in Medicaid and SCHIP: What Works in 
Reaching, Enrolling and Retaining Eligible 
Children, National Academy for State Health 
Policy, 2009. For example, a study published in 
Pediatrics compared the effect on low-income, 
Latino families in Boston of (a) standard 
Medicaid/CHIP outreach versus (b) intensive 
application assistance provided by community-
based case managers who proactively identified 
potentially eligible families, helped them apply 
for coverage, helped complete application 
forms, and tracked applications through to 
completion, intervening on behalf of low-
income families to solve problems. While 
the standard outreach methods enrolled 57 
percent of eligible children, 96 percent of 
eligible children targeted by community-based 
case managers received coverage. Flores, 
G. et al. “Randomized, Controlled Trial of 
the Effectiveness of Community-Based Case 
Management in Insuring Uninsured Latino 
Children” Pediatrics. December 2005. Vol. 116, 
No. 6, pp. 1433-1441.  
 
As another example, a randomized, controlled 
experiment examined the effect of facilitated 
enrollment on submission of the Free 
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) 
by certain low- and moderate-income families 
filing federal income tax returns with H&R 
Block. These were families with members 
between the ages of 15 and 30 who had not 
yet attended college. The control group was 
given brochures about the process of applying 
for student aid. With the first experimental 
group—the “form completion” group— H&R 
Block staff used tax return data and family 
interviews to complete the FAFSA, filing the 
form electronically if the family approved. The 
second experimental group—the “information-
only” group—received written, personalized 
estimates of eligibility for student aid, based 
on their tax returns, along with information 
about tuition costs at nearby colleges and 
encouragement to complete the application 
process, but H&R Block did not complete the 
form on behalf of consumers. 
 
Among dependents, completing the form on 
behalf of the family raised the proportion 
submitting applications from 40.2 percent to 
55.9 percent—a 40 percent relative increase—
and ultimately raised their likelihood of 
attending college by 25 to 30 percent. Among 
independent adults, the form completion 
intervention nearly tripled the likelihood 
of filing for student aid, raising the form 
submission rate from 13.8 percent to 39.5 
percent. Simply furnishing information 
had no statistically significant effect on the 
likelihood of submitting applications, among 
either dependents or independent adults. 
Eric P. Bettinger, Bridget Terry Long, Philip 
Oreopoulos, and Lisa Sanbonmatsu, “The Role 
Of Simplification And Information In College 
Decisions: Results From The H&R Block FAFSA 
Experiment,” National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 15361 (September 
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Navigators that facilitate individual enrollment 
and those that serve the small group market. 
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moderate-income individuals and those that 
serve small firms. 
 
In addition, policy-makers could identify 
the multiple functions that Navigators 
need to fulfill in the individual market by 
looking to the experiences of states that 
have successfully facilitated the enrollment 
of low-income consumers into subsidized 
coverage. Massachusetts again furnishes a 
useful example, with a network of contracts 
that includes not just “street level” community 
groups but also “back-up” organizations that 
offer expertise in the rights and responsibilities 
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briefings and updates in multiple locations, 
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about new developments and state officials 
hear about emerging problems. An exchange’s 
Navigator program that serves the individual 
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of these functions—“hands-on” facilitated 
enrollment, legally sophisticated “back-up” that 
is independent of the state, ongoing regional 
training, and flagging of emerging problems to 
guide state policy development.
48 ACA §1311(i)(6).
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and Cindy Mann to State Medicaid Directors, 
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Insurance Commissioners, Federal Support 
and Standards for Medicaid and Exchange 
Information Technology Systems, noting the 
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op cit.; Beshears, et al., op cit; Johnson, et al., 
2002, op cit,; and Johnson, et al., 2003, op cit. 
51 See ACA §§1413(b)(1)(A), 1413(b)(1)(A)(iv),  
and 1411(g)(1).
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the website could directly furnish the statement 
in real time. In other cases, the statement may 
need to be sent by mail or email. 
53 Setting the default as enrollment rather 
than non-enrollment can greatly increase 
participation rates, as illustrated by the 
behavioral economics research cited in earlier 
notes, including the classic example involving 
401(k) retirement accounts. When an employer 
establishes an account and enrolls new workers 
who complete forms, 33 percent participate. 
By contrast, when new employees are enrolled 
unless they complete forms opting out, 
enrollment reaches 90 percent. Laibson, op cit.  
 
In terms of subsidized health coverage, 
a precedent comes from “administrative 
renewal,” which the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 
(CHIPRA) describes as providing the parent 
with “a pre-printed form completed by the State 
based on the information available to the State” 
along with notice that “eligibility of the child 
will be renewed and continued based on such 
information unless the State is provided other 
information.” Social Security Act 2015(a)(4)(E)
(i), added by CHIPRA §104. State officials report 
that this approach, one of several best practices 
of which a state must implement at least five to 
obtain performance bonuses under CHIPRA, 
greatly increases participation rates and lowers 
administrative costs without undermining 
program integrity. Andrea Cohen, Melinda 
Dutton, Kerry Griffin, and Gregory Woods, 
Streamlining Renewal in Medicaid and SCHIP: 
Strategies from Other States and Lessons 
for New York, prepared by Manatt Health 
Solutions, a division of Manatt Phelps & Phillips, 
LLP, for the United Hospital Fund, 2008, http://
www.manatthealthsolutions.com/publications/
articles/Streamlining_Renewal.pdf. 
54 If prior-year state income tax data show income-
eligibility for Medicaid, a state implementing 
Express Lane Eligibility provides the child with 
Medicaid, without requiring any more recent 
information. If prior-year income tax data show 
that the child qualifies CHIP, the child receives 
that subsidy as an initial matter. However, the 
family also receives a notice explaining how it 
can seek more generous Medicaid coverage by 
applying for subsidies using standard Medicaid 
procedures, which can include the use of more 
recent income information. See Social Security 
Act §1902(e)(13), subparagraphs (H), (A)(i)
(I) and (II), and (C)(ii)(III), added by CHIPRA 
§203(a). 
55 Wisconsin Office of Health Care Reform, Test 
Drive the Insurance Exchange, accessed on 
3/21/2011, http://www.healthcarereform.
wisconsin.gov. 
56 Office of Consumer Information and Insurance 
Oversight and CMS, Guidance for Exchange 
and Medicaid Information Technology (IT) 
Systems, Version 1.0, November 3, 2010. 
57 C. Millett, A. Chattopadhyay, and A. Bindman, 
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Health Plan Choice in California Medicaid,” 
American Journal of Public Health, 
e-published Sept. 23, 2010:e1–e6.
58 Rules that identify the plan into which a 
consumer is enrolled by default can fulfill 
multiple objectives. Most important is to 
provide beneficiaries with coverage likely to 
be in their best interests, taking into account 
relative premium costs, out-of-pocket cost-
sharing, consumer address, and available 
information about the consumer’s health 
care needs. But default enrollment can also 
be used as leverage to lower premiums in the 
exchange—an approach that Massachusetts 
successfully employed, Dorn, Hill, Hogan, 
op cit.—or to reward plans that meet state 
objectives related to quality improvement, 
delivery system reform, and the like. 
59 For example, when Florida’s Medicaid program 
gave beneficiaries multiple health plan options 
with diverse benefits, more than 40 percent 
did not select a plan and so had one chosen by 
default. Despite the availability of call centers 
to help consumers sort through their options, 
more than half found it hard to understand 
health plan information and hard to pick a 
plan, only half knew about available counseling 
to help with plan choices, and most did not 
understand even such basic facts as consumer 
opt-out rights or the approximate number 
of health plan choices. Teresa A. Coughlin, 
Sharon K. Long, Timothy Triplett, Samantha 
Artiga, Barbara Lyons, R. Paul Duncan, and 
Allyson G. Hall, “Florida’s Medicaid Reform: 
Informed Consumer Choice?” Health Affairs 
27(6): w523–w532 (published online 14 
October 2008); Jessica Greene and Ellen 
Peters, “Medicaid Consumers and Informed 
Decisionmaking,” Health Care Financing 
Review 30(3):25-40, Spring 2009. 
60 Yaniv Hanoch and Thomas Rice, “Can Limiting 
Choice Increase Social Welfare? The Elderly 
and Health Insurance,” The Milbank Quarterly, 
84(1):37-73, 2006. 
61 A similar alternative would present consumers 
with a small number of plans that meet the 
criteria specified by consumers, such as 
inclusion of a particular provider or low cost-
sharing amounts for particular prescription 
drugs. However, this alternative would probably 
be less effective in promoting enrollment since 
consumers would still face a choice between 
plans that might trigger the ambivalence and 
uncertainty described by Hanoch and Rice.
62 By the end of 2008, three-quarters of 401(k) 
plans offered target-date funds as an option. 
Jack Van Derhei and Sarah Holden, 401(k) 
Plan asset Allocation, Account Balances, and 
Loan Activity in 2008, the Employee Benefit 
Research Institute and the Investment Company 
Institute, October 2009. 
63 Given the novelty of this approach to health 
plan selection, field-testing could be important 
to see whether, in fact, this option would be 
selected by many consumers. 
64 Unlike state-specific new hires data bases, 
NDNH includes federal employment as well 
as reports from employers in all states. NDNH 
thus provides information about earnings 
from multi-state employers, information that 
such employers are required to report to only 
one state workforce agency and that are not 
typically included in other states’ databases. 
65 CMS could make clear that, when SNAP or 
another public benefit program has already 
found someone to have income below 138 
percent of FPL, the state can automatically 
qualify such a person as income-eligible for 
Medicaid. Social Security Act §1902(e)(14)
(D)(ii), added by ACA §2002(a), expressly 
allows this with Express Lane Eligibility (ELE) 
for children, but ACA also authorizes CMS 
to reach this result for adults through 1115 
waivers. According to new Social Security Act 
§1902(e)(14)(D)(i)(I), MAGI does not apply 
to “[i]ndividuals who are eligible for medical 
assistance under … a waiver of the plan on a 
basis that does not require a determination 
of income by the State agency administering 
the State plan or waiver, including as a 
result of eligibility for, or receipt of, other 
Federal or State aid or assistance.” That same 
authority could apply to children, if CHIPRA’s 
authorization for states to implement ELE via 
State Plan Amendment expires after FY 2013.  
 
For example, SNAP is limited to households 
with gross incomes at or below 133 percent 
FPL. In theory, different household definitions 
used in SNAP and the federal income tax system 
mean that a few SNAP recipients may have 
MAGI slightly above 138 percent FPL and so 
qualify for subsidies in the exchange rather 
than Medicaid. But after a family has completed 
the SNAP eligibility determination process 
and been found to qualify, the value added by 
requiring the family to go through a second 
such process seems greatly outweighed by 
(a) the burden imposed on the family and the 
resulting possibility that an eligible family will 
remain uninsured because it does not complete 
the process; and (b) the administrative costs of 
making a second, largely redundant eligibility 
determination. Accordingly, interpreting the 
Affordable Care Act to authorize 1115 waivers 
as suggested here would help accomplish the 
legislation’s basic goals.
66 Government Accountability Office, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: Agencies Progress 
in Implementing Recent Legislation, but 
Enhancements Could Improve Future Plans, 
GAO-11-39, October 2010.
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